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With approximately 150 million Americans obtaining insurance through
their employer, traditional employer-provided health insurance remains the
cornerstone of the American health insurance market for the non-elderly,
non-poor population.
The federal and state health insurance exchanges, while
generating a great amount of attention and controversy,
still only represent a small fraction of the marketplace.
But will it stay this way? Will the new rules and
incentives embodied in the Affordable Care Act—
especially after the employer mandate is fully put into
place—cause significant changes in the use of employerbased group health insurance for this population? In the
short run, my answer to this second question is no. But
in the longer run, there is greater potential for erosion
from employer-sponsored insurance, depending on how
firms themselves respond to the subsidies available on
the exchanges for low-wage workers.1

ASSUMPTIONS
As an economist, there are a few commonly-held
assumptions that underlie my own thoughts on the
future of employer-sponsored health insurance:
Assumption #1: Employees pay for all their health
insurance. With few exceptions, it is the employees,
not their employers, who will always bear the benefits

SUMMARY
• Over the next five years, the effects of the ACA on employersponsored insurance will be modest. In the longer run, there is
greater potential for disruption, depending on how firms respond
to the subsidies available on the exchanges for low-wage workers.
In all, only about 15% of the workforce likely will be affected.
• The impacts of the ACA on firms will vary widely based on three
main factors: 1) the size of the firm, 2) the average compensation
within the firm, and 3) the degree to which wages within the firm
are homogenous or heterogeneous.
• Keeping in mind that employees pay for all their health insurance,
group insurance is not intrinsically superior to private exchanges,
and cost trumps choice for consumers, firms will choose the option that maximizes benefits to their workers, takes advantage
of the best available subsidies while avoiding tax penalties, and
results in the lowest administrative costs.
• Making all low-wage workers eligible for the same subsidies,
whether they acquire coverage on the exchanges or in group
plans, would be reasonable and involve less distortions.
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and costs of health insurance, whether
they shop on the exchanges or pay
premiums from wages for group
insurance. Insurance premiums paid
by employers are part of compensation, and offset money wages. By the
same token, employers cannot shift
the burden of health insurance premiums to workers, because if they do,
they would have to compensate them
more in money wages.
Assumption #2: Group insurance is not intrinsically superior. The
value of an insurance arrangement is
derived from the ability of workers
to choose insurance that is efficiently
priced, reflective of the benefits
received, and appropriate to their
needs. If these are the chief criteria of
evaluating the efficiency of a system of
coverage, there is no inherent value in
preserving group insurance if private
exchanges can provide the same services at lower costs.
Assumption #3: Cost trumps
choice. Surveys show that health-care
consumers favor having more insurance plan options, but what those surveys don’t address is how much more
those people are willing to spend
to have additional options available. Employees may accept a small
increase in cost in order to move to
the greater number of choices on the

exchanges, but it’s safe to assume that
people who aren’t sufficiently dissatisfied with their current plan would not
accept significantly higher premiums
than what they pay in group insurance
in order to have more choices on the
exchanges.
With these factors of cost and
choice in mind, we conclude that
the interests of the employers and
employees should run parallel to each
other: both should want employees to
have access to those attractive, efficiently managed and priced insurance
plans that employees prefer at those
prices. It then stands to reason that
firms will choose the option that a)
maximizes benefits to their workers, b) takes advantage of the best
available subsidies while avoiding tax
penalties, and c) results in the lowest administrative costs. Therefore,
in order to predict the most likely
response of employers to the ACA,
we must determine whether and how
the ACA changes what is in the best
interests of their employees.

ANALYSIS
The impacts of the ACA on firms
will vary widely based on three main
factors: 1) the size of the firm, 2) the
average compensation within the firm,

NOTES
This brief builds on key points made by Mark Pauly during
an October 9, 2014 conference co-sponsored by the Penn
Wharton Public Policy Initiative and Leonard Davis Institute
of Health Economics entitled, “Health Care Reform 2015:
What the Research Tells Us.”
2 The U.S. Census Bureau Statistics of U.S. Business Annual
Data for 2011 indicates that the 96.2% of employer firms
with fewer than 50 employees in 2011 accounted for
27.6% of all non-self-employed workers.
1
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and 3) the degree to which wages
within the firm are homogenous (all
workers earning roughly the same
amount) or heterogeneous (a mix
of high-, medium-, and low-wage
workers). Though this distinction is
not specified in law, for our purposes
we will describe small firms as having
fewer than 50 employees, and medium
firms as employing between 50 and
200.2
To begin to understand the effects
of the ACA, we will start by examining the two extremes of this spectrum:
small low-wage firms (i.e., worker
incomes below 200% of the poverty
line) providing insurance, and large
high-wage firms (i.e., worker incomes
above 500% of the poverty line) providing insurance.
Small Low-Wage Firms: These
firms will likely be among the most
heavily impacted by the ACA, and
the American workers they employ
are prime candidates for moving to
exchanges. Small businesses were
unlikely to be providing insurance
before the ACA, but if they were, the
only subsidy they would have received
would have been a small tax exclusion
worth approximately 15% of the provided benefits. Since these firms are
typically homogenous with respect to
wages, employers who did offer insur-
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ance likely would only have offered a
single plan, and their employees who
bought insurance in the small group
market often faced unappealing and
volatile premiums.
Post-ACA, I would expect to
see a dramatically different landscape. Businesses with fewer than 25
workers are now potentially eligible
for Supplemental Health Options
Policy (SHOP) benefits, although
their implementation has been slow.
Employees at 200% of the poverty
line can receive Silver Plans with a
generous 50% subsidy. Or they can
buy plans through the exchanges
with loadings (extra fees added to
basic premiums to insure higher-risk
individuals) of about 15%. Given that
the net change in subsidy is about
35% (from 50% to 15%) or about
$1400 on a typical $4000 premium,
the additional subsidies available in
exchanges will incentivize employers
who were offering insurance to stop
paying their part of the premium and
instead pay the money as wages to let
their employees seek better options
through the exchanges. Since there is
little efficiency advantage at the small
group level, these firms have little
to lose in making the switch. However, because the number of workers
in low-wage small firms previously
obtaining employment-based coverage
was small, the main effect will not be
erosion of group insurance, but rather
initiation of insurance purchase by the
formerly uninsured.
Large High-Wage Firms: I
expect these firms to exhibit the
smallest degree of change from
the ACA. Before the ACA, more
than 95% of the employees at these
firms already had self-insured group

coverage with loadings of about 5%.
Moreover, they often had three or four
plan options from which employees
could choose, with coverage far more
generous than that of a Silver Plan,
although offerings typically would
decrease as the company size shrinks.
If the marginal income tax rate is
25%, the overall marginal federal tax
including payroll taxes would be about
30-40% (depending on the maximum
Social Security tax).
Although the regulations of the
ACA may slightly increase premiums because of required coverage of
preventive care and dependents up to
age 26, there is no reason to anticipate
any drastic change in the employersponsored insurance offered by these
large, high-wage firms. Incentives for
switching to the exchanges simply are
not there. Employees in this category
would not be eligible for any sizeable
premium subsidies, and any replacement of employer premium payments
with wages would be taxed at 30-40%.
If the firm has a lower-than-average
risk, exchange premiums actually
could become higher. The employer
mandate penalty for failing to offer
insurance is irrelevant in this case
because the firm is assumed to offer
coverage, but it would still be there to
remind employers not to do anything
foolish. Because of the high offerings already provided, group insurance would be the preferred option of
these firms even without the penalty.
Because the subsidy is lower in the
exchanges, there will be no switching to the exchanges. We may see
small effects on the tiny fraction of
uninsured working in large firms as
they switch from being uninsured into
having group coverage.
3

Firms between the Poles: The
effects of the ACA on other types of
firms would fall between these two
polar extremes. The ACA’s mandate
penalty is likely to have a modest
deterrent effect on large, low-wage
firms, which might consider dropping
employer-sponsored coverage, if the
subsidy available on the exchanges
is larger than the tax subsidy their
workers currently receive. By contrast,
small, high-wage firms likely provided
insurance coverage to their employees prior to the ACA; they would
have little incentive to switch to the
exchanges now. The exchanges might
offer more insurance plan choices,
but at the cost of a lost tax subsidy,
typically in the range of 20 to 50%,
depending on income. As there is little
evidence to suggest that workers are
interested in paying more for increased
choice, I expect these small, high-wage
firms will stay off the exchanges.
Similarly, medium-sized firms are
likely to continue offering employersponsored health insurance and may
actually offer new, expanded coverage
because of the employer mandate—
that is, unless the average wage at
such a firm is so low (below 200% of
poverty) that the exchange subsidy
exceeds the amount of the penalty
($2000) plus the tax exclusion (at
least $450). Medium-sized firms also
tend to be heterogeneous in terms of
wages, with some high-wage workers
and some low-wage earners, and that
heterogeneity will help keep these
firms nailed to the employer-based
setting. While low-wage workers at
these firms might be better off switching to the exchanges, where they could
benefit from larger subsidies, highwage workers would be worse off, as
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they would lose their tax exclusion
while being ineligible for any compensatory exchange subsidy. As firms
tend to respond more to the interests
of their high-wage workers, who are
more expensive to train and harder to
replace, we should expect mediumsized firms with greater wage heterogeneity to heed the interests of their
high-wage workers by sticking with
employer-sponsored insurance.
Table 1 illustrates the distribution
of insurance status (e.g., uninsured
vs. individuals with public insurance,
private insurance, or a combination
of public and private insurance; and
whether they obtained the private
insurance through their employer
or individual market) for individuals between 138% and 400% of the
Federal Poverty Level, who are eligible for subsidies to purchase insurance through the exchanges, as well
the same breakdown for individuals between 138% and 350% of the
Federal Poverty Level, for whom the
value of the exchange subsidy roughly
equals the value of the tax exemption
for employer-sponsored insurance.

CONCLUSIONS
Over the next five years, the effects
of the ACA on employer-sponsored
insurance will be modest. Any erosion in group coverage is likely to be
limited to low-wage workers currently
offered insurance in smaller firms,
who are prime pickings for moving
to the exchanges. However, there are
relatively few such workers. The only
other vehicle would be conversion of
full-time low-wage workers in larger
firms to part-timers who are exempt
from the employer mandate penalty,

but there are serious limits on a firm’s
ability to manage with part-time
workers. And any erosion will be
offset to a considerable extent by the
expansion of employment-based covTABLE 1:

onto the exchanges. If such reconfigurations occur, the erosion of employerbased insurance would increase
significantly. And if this means that
large numbers of low-wage workers

ESTIMATED NUMBERS OF AMERICANS YOUNGER THAN 65 YEARS OF
AGE, ACCORDING TO INSURANCE STATUS, INCOME, AND EMPLOYER
SIZE, 2012.*

Insurance Status

Income 138-400% of the

Income 138-350% of the

Federal Poverty Level

Federal Poverty Level

All		

98,739,165

84,483,590

Public insurance only

8,824,391

8,332,361

1,888,627

1,737,043

In firms with >=50 employees
Private insurance only

68,900,566

56,929,424

Employer-sponsored insurance

62,386,415

51,215,185

In firms with >=50 employees

55,942,112

45,672,517

6,514,151

5,714,239

3,236,450

2,918,676

5,811,337

5,078,155

Employer-sponsored insurance

4,876,367

4,210,647

In firms with >=50 employees

3,787,388

3,286,568

Individual market
In firms with >=50 employees
Private and public insurance

Individual market

934,971

867,508

346,024

304,923

15,202,871

14,143,650

7,745,201

7,225,688

In firms with >=50 employees
Uninsured
In firms with >=50 employees

* Data are from an analysis of the Current Population Survey, 2013 Annual Social and Economic Supplement.

erage to previously uninsured workers
in medium and large firms, which are
much less likely to send workers to the
exchanges. In all, I estimate that only
15% of the workforce will be affected.
The long-term picture is murkier,
and depends greatly on how creative
workers and firms are in responding
to the incentives of the ACA. Since
low-wage workers are better off in
the exchanges, where they are eligible
for a relatively generous subsidy, one
could imagine firms spinning off their
low-wage workers into small, lowwage firms that would send workers
4

are spun out of less expensive and
highly efficient employer-based group
plans, then that would not be a good
economic outcome.
My personal recommendation
as an economist would be to make
all low-wage workers eligible for the
same subsidies, whether they acquire
coverage on the exchanges or in group
plans. That type of scenario would be
reasonable and involve less distortions and would leave the future of
employer-sponsored insurance looking
much as it is today.

publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

MARK V. PAULY, PHD
Professor of Health Care Management and Business Economics and
Public Policy, The Wharton School
Mark V. Pauly holds the position of Bendheim Professor in the
Department of Health Care Management at the Wharton School
of the University of Pennsylvania, where is a Professor of Health
Care Management and Business Economics and Public Policy.
Dr. Pauly is a former commissioner on the Physician Payment
Review Commission and an active member of the Institute of
Medicine. One of the nation’s leading health economists, Dr.
Pauly has made significant contributions to the fields of medical economics and health insurance. His classic study on the
economics of moral hazard was the first to point out how health
insurance coverage may affect patients’ use of medical services.
Subsequent work, both theoretical and empirical, has explored the
effect of conventional insurance coverage on preventative care, on
outpatient care, and on prescription drug use in managed care. In
addition, he has explored the influences that determine whether

insurance coverage is available and, through several cost-effectiveness studies, the influence of medical care and health practices on
health outcomes and cost. His work in health policy deals with
the appropriate design for Medicare in a budget-constrained environment and the ways to reduce the number of uninsured through
tax credits for public and private insurance. Dr. Pauly has served
on the Institute of Medicine panels on improving the financing
of vaccines and on public accountability for health insurers under
Medicare. He also is a former member of the U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services National Advisory Committee to
the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality.

ABOUT THE PENN WHARTON
PUBLIC POLICY INITIATIVE

ABOUT PENN WHARTON PUBLIC
POLICY INITIATIVE ISSUE BRIEFS

CONTACT THE PENN WHARTON
PUBLIC POLICY INITIATIVE

The Penn Wharton Public Policy Initiative
(PPI) is a hub for research and education,
engaging faculty and students across
University of Pennsylvania and reaching
government decision-makers through independent, practical, timely, and nonpartisan
policy briefs. With offices both at Penn and
in Washington, DC, the Initiative provides
comprehensive research, coverage, and
analysis, anticipating key policy issues on
the horizon.

Penn Wharton PPI publishes issue briefs at
least once a month, tackling issues that are
varied but share one common thread: they
are central to the economic health of the
nation and the American people. These Issue
Briefs are nonpartisan, knowledge-driven
documents written by Wharton and Penn
faculty in their specific areas of expertise.

At Penn
Steinberg Hall-Dietrich Hall, Room 3012
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6302
+1.215.898.1197
In Washington, DC
1350 I (“Eye”) Street, NW, Suite 1270
Washington, DC 20005
+1.202.503.3772

For additional copies, please visit the Penn Wharton PPI website at publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu.
Follow us on Twitter: @PennWhartonPPI

Founded in 1881 as the first collegiate business school, the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania is recognized globally for intellectual leadership and ongoing innovation across every major
discipline of business education. With a broad global community and one of the most published business school faculties, Wharton creates economic and social value around the world.

